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Weather is an increasingly important factor in naval operations.  Historical 
analysis provides examples of weather and its influence over military operations.  Prior 
to World War II, weather conditions were simply endured by adversaries.  In the 1950’s 
and 1960’s, the role of weather changed.  This change in the military significance of 
weather has its roots in changing venues of naval operations, changes in forecasting 
technologies and changes in military weapons systems.  During the 20th century, 
weather has made the transition from being an equalizer to a force multiplier.  The 
United States need to continue its leading work in environmental prediction in order to 
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Introduction 
Regardless of geographical location, economic status, or political affiliation, the 
daily weather is a part of our life.  Prior to leaving home, most people at least try to hear 
or see a weather forecast to help determine clothing or plan activities.  And, “How’s the 
weather there?” might be the universal conversational masterpiece.  Although weather 
influences our lives, rarely does it significantly alter how we live our lives.  Today, we 
have SUV’s, insulated weatherproof garments, and innovative building materials as 
well as construction techniques that will get us through most of what nature throws our 
way.  Although civilians easily adapt to weather conditions, military organizations 
must contend with the impact of meteorological factors.  Military personnel, their 
equipment, and their operations are sensitive to a large number of environmental 
factors.  In some cases, battles throughout history have been won or lost based on the 
weather. 
Of the different branches of the armed services, navies have been the most 
susceptible to environmental conditions due to their operational environment.  The 
different factors associated with operations in maritime environments have made 
weather forecasting especially important to naval operations.  The US Navy, along with 
civilian help, has made significant investments in both personnel and equipment to 
ensure the timely preparation and dissemination of vital weather data. 
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The forecasts generated by the Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command 
(METOC) have provided essential information to the men and women in the Navy for 
more than eighty years.  Prior to METOC’s contributions, the best source of information 
was usually the anecdotal experience of the ship’s commander.  On most occasions, 
weather was simply endured by the parties at conflict, with weather-induced victory or 
defeat largely dependent on location, or luck. 
Weather plays a critical role in the conduct of naval operations.  The role of 
weather has changed dramatically in the 20th century, making a transition from being an 
element simply endured, to a major factor dictating the conduct of battles.  Specifically, 
the decades following World War II are the watershed era when this change took place.  
This new role of weather emerged not because weather has changed, but because of 
new naval strategies, advancements in weapons, and improvements in weather 
forecasting technology.  In today’s naval engagements, accurate depiction and 
forecasting of environmental conditions can be used to provide a significant advantage 
over an adversary. 
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Chapter One:  Historical Cases Demonstrating  the Significance of 
Weather and Meteorological Forecasts 
Weather conditions have played a significant role in the history of civilization. 
Events on both land and sea have been at the mercy of meteorological conditions, and 
these have strongly influenced the foreign policy of nations, the conduct of revolutions, 
and the success or failure of military operations.   As a factor, weather has not always 
been the single greatest factor in determining the outcome of conflicts.  However, in 
some instances, weather has been truly decisive.  
As important as the weather itself are the people who produced and 
disseminated weather information to decision-makers.   With the improvement in 
forecasting abilities, weather personnel played an increasingly important role by 
assembling more accurate forecasts and enabling leaders to make more informed 
decisions.  However, accurate information did not necessarily mean the forecasts were 
relied upon as significant factors worthy of consideration.  In some instances, 
commanders who ignored forecasts encountered disastrous results. 
Proprietor of perhaps the largest geographical empire in the thirteenth century, 
Ghengis Khan learned the important role of weather in military operations at sea.  With 
his heart set on bringing the Japanese Islands under his control, Ghengis Khan 
attempted an amphibious assault in 1274.  In keeping with the custom of ocean voyages 
during his century, Ghengis had astrologers and diviners on board his ships, the ancient 
    4 
equivalents of modern meteorologists.i  Available records do not detail if these weather 
personnel provide warnings of the disaster that beset the Mongol invasion fleet only a 
few days after their assault.  Following the initial landings that favored the Mongols, a 
typhoon swept in from the Pacific and destroyed the Mongol ships at anchor, and 
forced a retreat back to China.  Over three hundred ships and 20,000 men were lost.ii 
Frustrated by the failure of his initial attempt, Ghengis effected another landing 
in 1281.  This second invasion fleet consisted of forty-five hundred ships and 150,000 
men.  They set sail and initially retook the island of Iki and established a foothold on 
Kyushu.  However, another typhoon struck and successfully repelled the invaders a 
second time.  Over four thousand ships and 130,000 men were lost, most struck down 
on the beaches by bands of Japanese soldiers who killed the shipwrecked invaders.iii  
After these two experiences, the Japanese believed for many centuries that a powerful 
spirit guarded their islands.  These divine winds were called kamikaze. 
Another significant invasion thwarted by the weather was the Spanish Armada.  
Miscalculations on both the part of Philip II of Spain and Elizabeth I of England brought 
the two nations to arms in 1588.  When amassing the largest single fleet in history, 
Philip II believed the capitulation of England to be a virtual guarantee.  However, 
historians generally note Philip’s overconfidence in the poorly trained soldiers and 
sailors that made up the bulk of his invading force.iv  But neither this lack of talent nor 
the tactical superiority of the British would be the decisive factor of this engagement. 
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Throughout July of 1588, light winds and strong currents filled the English 
Channel.  As a result, the British and Spanish ships engaged each other in small 
engagements that did not inflict serious damage on either side, with the exception of 
one battle where the Spanish lost two ships, the Nuestra Senora del Rosario, and the San 
Salvador.  The Spanish fleet numbered at least one hundred forty ships, with nearly 
21,000 soldiers embarked as an invasion force.v 
When the English launched their fireship attack on the evening of 7 August, they 
had the weather gauge (they were windward of the Spanish fleet).  Being windward or 
leeward (downwind) of an enemy force during the age of sail could be a tremendous 
advantage, or disadvantage depending on the situation.  In the case of the English, 
being to windward was an advantage because of their use of fireships.  A fireship was a 
vessel set afire and sailed towards an enemy fleet. As the Spanish retreated in disarray, 
the English closed in on their enemy for the first time in significant force.  This was the 
opportunity to utilize their superior training and seamanship to defeat the mighty 
Armada. 
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Figure 1: Map of Spanish Armada Routevi 
 
However, as the British gained on the Spanish fleet, the wind backed suddenly to 
the south, giving the Spanish the opportunity to sail away from the British.vii  Instead of 
facing the British, the Spanish sailed counterclockwise around the British Isles and then 
onto Lisbon via the west coast of Ireland. 
Although the ships of the English and Spanish fleets did meet and exchange 
gunfire, the meteorological conditions played a significant role in the outcome of the 
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engagement.  First, the light winds and strong currents relegated the two sides to many 
skirmishes rather than one large engagement.  And finally, as the English prepared to 
deliver a coup de grace, the change in wind direction allowed the Spanish to escape.  
Not only was an invasion of England thwarted, but the Spanish would never 
significantly threaten the British for supremacy of the seas. 
Like sea battles, land engagements have also been affected by weather 
conditions. During the second half of the seventeenth century, France and England 
sought to gain control of the Dutch Republic.  Although a relatively small country, the 
Dutch Republic functioned as the financial center of a world swelled with wealth from 
the Age of Exploration.  The capital and resources of this unprecedented growth in 
European wealth congregated in the banking houses of Amsterdam.  One of the 
problems of success was the threat of invasion by a hostile power.  With England to the 
north of vital Dutch trade routes, and France to the south, it was only a matter of time 
before these two powers attempted to pillage the wealth amassed by the Dutch.  
England’s attempts were exclusively naval, coming at significant cost to King Charles II.  
Over time, the expenditures needed to engage the Dutch became too much for Britain’s 
shallow pockets, and the English monarch decided to curtail his attacks.viii 
However, French King Louis XIV continued to apply pressure to the Dutch, and 
struck with an invasion force in the summer of 1672.  French troops advanced along 
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both banks of the Maas River, circumvented key Dutch defensive positions, and 
threatened the Zuider Zee (a shallow inland sea to the east and south of Amsterdam.)ix 
The Dutch defenders were badly outgunned and outmanned, and resorted to 
flooding the approaches to Amsterdam by destroying dikes.  This created a 20 km moat 
around the city and temporarily saved Amsterdam from invasion.  The French decided 
to wait until the water froze during the winter months before attempting an assault on 
the city.  In late December, the French began to cross the flooded areas, but warmer 
than normal temperatures weakened the ice, and the French were forced to retreat.  
Temperature estimates for this time period in 1672 were nearly 3.5˚C, which was well 
above the average of 0.5˚C.x  The unseasonably warm weather saved the Dutch, and 
spelled disaster for the French. 
Over 100 years later, weather would have more disastrous consequences for the 
French nobility.  In the summer of 1788, a severe drought struck France which impacted 
that year’s harvest.  Every weather observation station in France, with the exception of 
Paris, recorded precipitation levels that were lower than the average by at least 35%.xi  
This low level of moisture in combination with higher than normal temperatures 
resulted in a grain harvest that was only half of the mean figures for that period.xii   
Many historians lend significant weight to the rise in grain and bread prices as 
the precipitating event that led to the French Revolution.  Prices were at an all-time high 
just before the 14 July attack on the Bastille.  According to some sources, prices were 
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75% higher compared to the previous year.xiii  With more than 55% of peasant income 
dedicated to the purchase of bread, this increase in price was unbearable for the poor of 
France.xiv 
Only a decade after revolutionary events in France, Britain also found itself at the 
mercy of meteorological conditions.  In fact , “the climate governed Britain’s naval 
strategy and planning for the Baltic region.”xv  Faced with crop failures in 1799 due to a 
cool and rainy growing season, Britain netted only one-half of its normal grain 
harvest.xvi  Another disastrous harvest in 1800 put Britain on its heels again, having to 
contend with only a three-quarters harvest due to incessant rains in the latter part of 
August.xvii 
Loss of the grain harvest for two successive years put Britain in a difficult 
position.  Normally known as a grain exporter, Britain needed to shore up its reserves, 
and it turned to the ports that lined the Baltic Sea as a source of supply.  However, all of 
these ports were under the nominal control of the Russian Tsar.  Russia did not look 
favorably upon England for their support of Austria’s campaign of territorial 
aggrandizement.  Relations came to a crisis when Britain and Russia disputed 
ownership of Malta, which had originally been part of Napoleon’s empire.  In 1800, 
Tsar Paul I placed an embargo on British ships in all ports controlled or influenced by 
Russia, which effectively cut Britain off from restocking its grain supplies.  This put 
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Britain in a difficult position, and the Admiralty sent a fleet to the Baltic to break the 
embargo.xviii 
The British use of force to break the embargo and the preceeding examples 
underscore the broad impact of weather.  As the nineteenth century drew to a close, 
technology began to provide the tools needed to understand the forces of 
meteorological phenomenon.  For example, the invention of the telegraph made 
meteorology a practical science.  Observations from distant points could be collected 
and analyzed, and then disseminated in relatively quick fashion.  Scientists now had 
some of the tools they needed to begin making sense of the weather and the forces at 
work.xix  This technological progression continued into the twentieth century, picking 
up considerable pace during the 1930’s and 1940’s.  These specific developments will be 
considered in a later chapter.  The net result of the technological change was increased 
accuracy and greater understanding of weather phenomenon. 
With this increased accuracy, the role of the weather forecaster became more 
significant.  During World War II, weather personnel redefined their role within the 
military command structure by providing key information to commanders.  Weather 
still played its major role in the outcome of events, but now it could be used to the 
advantage of the military powers who could produce more reliable predictions of 
future meteorological conditions. 
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Weather forecasting and weather conditions played an extremely significant role 
in World War II.  One of the best examples involves Operation Overlord (D-Day), when 
Eisenhower decided to delay the invasion on 4 June by twenty-four hours after input 
from the SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) Meteorological 
Committee led by Captain J. M. Staggxx  The forecast called for high winds and heavy 
precipitation, and would have put the invading force at a significant disadvantage.  
However, early the next morning Stagg announced a possible opening in the storm for 
approximately thirty-six hours on the following day.  Based on this analysis, 
Eisenhower gave the order to proceed even though his advisors were still split on the 
go/no-go decision.xxi   
The weather was also on the mind of the German defenders.  Many historians 
have asserted that the Germans did not have adequate resources to forecast the 
conditions in the Channel during the first week of June. xxii  However, a German 
meteorologist, Werner Schwerdtfeger, published in his memoirs in 1986 that the 
forecasts given to German commanders throughout the chain of command accurately 
predicted the conditions in the Channel.xxiii   It is true that Field Marshall Rommel left 
his command post to see his wife for the evening, but that decision seemed to be based 
more on his personal interpretation of the weather than an official forecast.    As he 
departed his command post in light drizzle, he remarked “There’s not going to be an 
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invasion.  And if there is, they won’t get off the beaches.”xxiv  As a result of his own 
decision, he was not at his post when Allied forces landed.xxv    
In the months after the Normandy landings, the Germans started to put more 
faith in their weather personnel.  In early December 1944, a strange order came from the 
Wolfsschanze* requesting an almost impossible task.  The German command staff needed 
to have a “two plus five day” forecast which means two days notice before a five day 
period of a certain condition.  The Germans were looking for fog and snow over the 
Ardennes Forest region and southern England.  Faced with this task, the German 
meteorology staff managed to deliver a forecast on 15 December which guaranteed only 
three days of fog in the region.  Based on this input, the Germans launched their last 
ditch offensive known as the Battle of the Bulge (fought in the Ardennes forest during 
Christmas 1944) .xxvi   Without the benefit of air cover and their forward positions 
overextended, the Allied troops struggled to maintain their lines in the face of intensive 
German attacks.  However, the return of clear weather enabled Allied air power to 
support the ground troops, and the Germans eventually retreated.  The German thrust 
came dangerously close to breaking the Allied offensive.  
Like the Army, the Navy in World War II wrestled with key decisions revolving 
around the forecasts of Navy meteorologists, and in more than one instance, weather 
 
* Wolf’s Den-Hitler’s secret bunker 
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and weather forecasting played significant roles.  An example of the significance of 
weather and METOC personnel is during the Battle of the Coral Sea. 
In May 1942, the Japanese continued their march southward across the Pacific, 
threatening Australia.  Admiral Nimitz, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, 
deployed the U.S.S. Yorktown and the U.S.S. Lexington to the Coral Sea in order to 
check the Japanese advance.  The weather in the region of battle was dominated by a 
stationary front that produced clouds in the lower and middle layers.  This provided 
good cover for both the Japanese and American carriers, making both difficult to detect.  
With the weather starting to clear on 7 May, the Americans decided to alter course and 
hide inside this front to prevent his force from being discovered.  This strategy paid off.  
On 8 May 1942, the American pilots broke out of the clouds only miles from their 
targets, and caught the Japanese fleet by surprise.  Under the recommendations of their 
METOC officer, Lt. Cmdr. Hubert Strange, the pilots of the Lexington flew under the 
cloud bases all the way to their target, and succeeded in sinking the first major Japanese 
warship of World War II. The pilots of the Yorktown did not get this guideline from their 
METOC officer, and did not hit their intended target. xxvii   
The same weather strategy that helped the Americans also aided the Japanese.  
In a later stage of the battle, the American carriers sailed southeast, leaving the frontal 
zone and entering the region of clear skies.  This enabled Japanese pilots to attack the 
U.S. ships in perfect visibility and sink the U.S.S. Lexington. 
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The Battle of the Coral Sea remains one of the most significant battles in history 
for two reasons.  Most history students learn that Coral Sea was the first time that major 
naval fleets engaged each other exclusively with their aircraft.  Not a single shot from a 
naval gun was fired at another ship.  However, the meaning of the words “weather 
gauge” had also become redefined.  If you had the weather gauge in the days of sailing 
vessels, you were upwind of your enemy and able to maneuver more adeptly.  In the 
age of the carrier, the weather gauge now referred to being assisted by the weather.xxviii 
Similar to the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway in early June 1942 is 
also a good example of meteorological impacts on naval operations.  Poor visibility and 
fog masked the approach of the Japanese strike fleet to the American scout planes who 
knew the course and general location of the attacking force, but were unable to locate it 
until it was only 180 miles from Midway.xxix This prevented the American commanders 
(Nimitz and Fletcher) from ordering strikes until they themselves were in range of the 
Japanese carriers.  The Japanese force had been steaming in the intensifying storm 
system that had been predicted accurately by Pearl Harbor’s weather station.  However, 
the storm system was moving faster than the task force, and eventually, the Japanese 
fleet steamed in almost unrestricted visibility.xxx  This made them vulnerable to attack 
from U.S. Navy forces. 
When US Navy forces attacked the Japanese, they utilized recommendations 
from their METOC officer, Lt. Cmdr. Strange.  Strange recommended that his pilots 
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watch for wind shifts associated with the front by observing the change in the direction 
of the white caps.  This allowed them to identify the change in wind, and compensate 
for the direction change in their flying formation.  As a result of Strange’s 
recommendations, the planes from the U.S.S. Yorktown were very tight compared to 
the other carrier groups as they approached the Japanese carrier forces.xxxi   This 
enabled them to mount a more effective attack on the Japanese carriers.  In this battle, 
the Japanese suffered the loss of four carriers to the one lost by the Americans.  More 
importantly, the Japanese lost a large portion of their best trained carrier pilots, and it is 
believed that the Japanese never regained the high level of training and expertise in 
their naval aviators after this engagement.xxxii 
The ability of METOC personnel to predict the weather assisted naval 
commanders in their conduct of operations.  However, forecasts were not always 
sufficiently accurate, nor did commanders always follow the recommendations of 
weather personnel.  In some instances, the decision to ignore METOC recommendations 
had disastrous impacts on naval operations.  One striking example occurred in mid-
December 1944. 
In order to support the land operations in the Philippines, Admiral Chester 
Nimitz directed Admiral William Halsey and his task force to operate in the waters just 
east of Luzon in order to provide air cover to General MacArthur’s land forces.  On 10 
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December, Halsey’s forces sortied from Ulithi with 131 ships, including twelve carriers 
to assist MacArthur.xxxiii 
In order to sustain operations, Halsey positioned his replenishment ships (oilers 
and ammunition ships) approximately twenty-four hours sailing time due east.  This 
left his supplies close enough for quick access, but also out of range of Japanese 
bombers.  Halsey’s carriers dashed out ahead, delivered air strikes for three days, and 
then returned to his replenishment ships on 16 December. 
Weather indicators on 16 December were vastly different among ships, 
depending on location.xxxiv  However, the barometers dropped significantly on all the 
vessels, and the Third Fleet soon found itself in the grips of Typhoon Cobra.  As the 
Fleet passed through Cobra, three Navy ships were lost with 790 officers and men, and 
nearly 100 aircraft.xxxv 
With such an appalling loss, Admiral Nimitz convened a board of inquiry to 
investigate the events surrounding Cobra.  Perspectives on what happened vary 
considerably.  Admiral Halsey maintained that METOC did not give him suitable 
information with which to make an informed decision.  According to Halsey, there were 
limitations in the data provided from Fleet Weather Central in Pearl Harbor, and 
reconnaissance information was too slow in being decodedxxxvi   However, other sources 
(Halsey’s METOC officer)  indicate that Halsey received the forecasts warning of a 
major typhoon, but was too preoccupied with refueling/replenishment to avoid 
    17 
Cobra.xxxvii Were these the actions of an uninformed commander, or the moves of an 
aggressive admiral pursuing the enemy? 
Although this question was supposedly answered in a court of inquiry that 
validated the former explanation, the latter approach of an aggressive admiral may be 
more fitting.  Although either explanation is possible, Halsey ran straight through 
another storm only seven months later in June 1945.  Although the losses were less than 
Cobra, Typhoon Viper managed to exact a significant toll on the U.S. Navy. Thirty-three 
ships were damaged, seventy six planes were destroyed, and six men were killed.  In 
fact, Halsey suffered more losses at the hands of Typhoons Cobra and Viper than by the 
actions of the Japanese. 
Clearly, METOC officers and their products had significant impacts on the 
course of naval operations during World War II.  And, in the instances where their 
forecasts were ignored, disaster struck.  The Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of 
Midway, and Halsey’s Typhoon fiasco all underscore the pivotal role of the naval 
meteorological officer.  This would prove to be true in Korea as well. 
Meteorology in Korea reversed the roles of the American and Germans in World 
War II.  In the European theatre, German meteorologists were at a disadvantage 
because the general flow of the weather was from west to east.  While the Allied 
forecasters had ample data on which to rely, German meteorologists had to struggle 
with much sparser information.  This is the situation METOC personnel were faced 
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with in Korea.  Most of the Korean peninsula’s weather is dependent on the Asian 
continental land-mass.  While the Russian meteorological observations were either 
broadcast in the clear, decoded, or uselessxxxviii, the observations from Communist 
China were unavailable to the Americans.xxxix   This put them at a disadvantage in 
generating forecasts for the Korean area because they did not have accurate information 
about the weather patterns upwind of their forecast area.  This meant that the enemy 
would likely have more accurate weather information.  Although American forecasters 
were at a disadvantage for patterns emerging off of the Asian continent, they were at an 
advantage for predicting the typhoons which are maritime in origin.  It was this 
situation that allowed Navy meteorology to be effective. 
At the outbreak of the war, there were no navy meteorological assets in the 
region with the exception of ship-based personnel.  Unlike the Air-Force that had a 
weather central in Tokyo, the Navy had been caught unprepared.xl   Vice-Adm. Arthur 
Struble, in command of the Seventh Fleet, had only a chief-aerographer’s mate (CAM) 
and one areographer’s mate (AM) onboard his flagship, the U.S.S. Rochester.xli  To make 
things more difficult, weather observations and forecasts by radio from the USAF 
weather central in Tokyo and other information sources were not consistently available 
(out of radio range) to Joseph Zaffino, Struble’s CAM.xlii 
In the early days of the conflict, the forces defending South Korea had been 
pushed back to the Pusan Perimeter located in the southeastern portion of the 
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peninsula.  In order to ease the pressure on the defending forces, the Navy had been 
conducting strike missions trying to cut off the lines of supply to the advancing North 
Korean forces.  On 21 July 1950, Zaffino presented an opportunity to Struble that would 
enable the Navy to strike North Korean assets with surprise.xliii 
A typhoon had been making its way towards the Korean Peninsula, which 
would force the Seventh Fleet to make a course change.  Zaffino informed Struble that 
he could make one of two choices.  A conservative plan would be to head northeast of 
the Japanese island of Honshu, which would help shield the fleet from the major effects 
of the typhoon.  Zaffino’s other option was to make a fast night passage into the Yellow 
Sea and seek the protection of the island of Saishu To.  This option would allow the 
U.S.S. Valley Forge to launch operations in defense of the Pusan Perimeter.  However, 
this plan would work only if the typhoon turned more to the northwest, something that 
Zaffino felt it would do.xliv  Struble went with Zaffino’s forecast, and it held.  As a result 
of Zaffino’s reliable forecast, Struble launched air strikes that helped destroy an 
ammunition train as well as several key bridges.  As a result of his efforts, Zaffino was 
awarded a bronze star by Secretary of the Navy, Dan A. Kimball.xlv 
Another major navy meteorological effort centered around the daring Inchon 
landings.  In order to relieve pressure on the fragile Pusan Perimeter, MacArthur 
proposed landing amphibious forces (Operation Chromite) on the western coast of 
Korea at Inchon, which would cut off the supply routes of the encroaching communist 
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forces.  Inchon presented a difficult meteorological and oceanographic situation. The 
tidal range at Inchon was thirty-two feet, which limited day-time landings to only three 
or four days each month.  xlvi  Furthermore, the Japanese tide tables for Inchon 
disagreed with the ones compiled by the U.S. Navy.xlvii 
In order to resolve this issue, the navy dispatched Lt. Eugene Clark to assess the 
area around Inchon prior to the landings.  On 1 September 1950, Lt. Clark and his team 
of ROK officers (who had been Japanese Navy Officers in WWII) landed and performed 
a thorough reconnaissance of the area.  Their reports confirmed that the Japanese tide 
tables were more accurate, that the mud-flats would support no significant weight, and 
that the sea walls surrounding the invasion beaches were much higher than 
estimated.xlviii  This data was absolutely key in preparation for Operation Chromite. 
After the planning had been completed, the weather situation became important 
with Typhoon Keiza entering the area.  Navy and Air Force meteorologists based on 
Guam forecasted that Keiza may interfere significantly with the Inchon landings.xlix  
Under this forecast, the critical supply ships changed course to seek protection from the 
storm.  However, an experienced aerologist, Lt. Cmdr. Charles Barron felt that only the 
edges of Keiza would impact the supply fleet. He recommended to Admiral Robert 
Doyle that the supply fleet reverse course again and keep the Inchon landings on 
schedule.  His forecast proved to be correct and the landings occurred on the 
established timetable. l 
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Yet, another example of the significance of personnel in the decision-making 
process in regard to meteorology.  Similar to experiences in World War II, Navy 
METOC personnel played a significant role in the conduct of naval operations in the 
Korean War.  
Clearly, weather conditions have had a significant impact on civilization.  
Countries have been saved from invasion (Japan, Britain, Netherlands), changes in 
foreign policy have been made (Britain, Germany), revolutions have started (France), 
and battles have been won and lost (Germany, Allied Forces, North Koreans) on 
account of meteorological conditions.  In some cases forecasts were ignored (Germany, 
United States) and disastrous results occurred.  The historical record demonstrates the 
vital nature of weather prediction and personnel.   
The role of weather prediction and METOC personnel gained even greater 
significance after the end of the Korean conflict.  During the twentieth century, METOC 
continually adjusted in order to meet the demands required by the Navy.  These 
demands shifted significantly in response to two factors.  First, the strategy followed by 
the Navy adjusted to the changing nature of the adversaries faced by the United States.  
This required changes in overall naval strategy, which necessitated major shifts in the 
types of information required by naval commanders.  And second, advances in naval 
ordnance brought new demands on METOC staff to provide more accurate 
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information.  These changes made weather, and weather forecasting more critical to 
naval operations. 
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Chapter Two:  Recent Changes in US Naval Strategy and Weapons 
Technology 
Since the end of World War II, the United States Navy has faced numerous 
threats around the world.  In order to deal with those challenges, policy makers have 
followed a defined strategy maximizing the strengths of the Navy and achieving the 
goals of civilian policy makers.  From the Soviet Union to Osama bin Laden, the variety 
of threats has created a variety of approaches to naval operations, ranging from open 
ocean conflict to close-in shore combat.  In addition to recent changes in strategy, 
innovations in weapons technology in the last forty years have altered the conduct of 
naval operations.   
In order to keep pace with the changes in these two areas, METOC staff altered 
the support they provide to naval personnel.  Weather has always been important to 
ships at sea, but its role has changed significantly in light of current naval strategy and 
weapons technology.  Prior to World War II, the weather forecast came largely from the 
experience of the ship’s commanding officer who provided anecdotal forecasting based 
on his experience.  In the post World War II-era, naval operations reached a level of 
sophistication requiring a more comprehensive suite of products to support operations.  
As new strategies and weapons evolved, the role of the weather forecaster has grown 
significantly, and consequently, navy meteorologists fulfill a mission-critical role to 
current and future naval operations. 
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The pillars of American maritime strategy rest on two works released close to the 
turn of the twentieth century.  Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power on 
History (1880) and Julian Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911) 
provided a framework for creating a plan to counter the adversaries faced by maritime 
forces.  Prior to these works, naval officers had very little concept of tactics and no 
overall strategy.  The approach that naval officers used could be summed up in the 
words of British Lord Dundonald:  “Never mind manoeuvre, always go at them.” The 
concept of war at sea being a political act that should be connected to some overall 
national direction was totally foreign.li 
In the United States, this view changed when Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan 
joined the faculty at the Naval War College in Newport, RI.  The son of a West Point 
professor, Mahan entered the Naval Academy against the advice of his father.  After 
completing his course of study in 1859 and an undistinguished career as an officer for 
the Union in the Civil War, he was invited by Commodore Stephen Luce to join the 
faculty of the newly formed Naval War College in Newport, RI.   Mahan immediately 
accepted, and embraced the opportunity to pursue his academic interests.  He arrived 
in Newport in 1886, but found his role changed from professor to President of the 
College because Luce had been ordered back to sea.lii  
Mahan’s basic message to the officers in the program focused on the need for the 
United States to embrace the role of an international power and understand that naval 
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power, in addition to land power, held the key to the success of the nation.  In order to 
make this change, Mahan relied upon the lessons of history to teach about the future.  
“The study of the sea history of the past will be found instructive, by its illustration of 
the general principles of maritime war.”liii 
In history, Mahan found the lessons applicable to maritime strategy.  Drawing 
upon the experiences of various maritime powers between 1660-1783 and the writings 
of the great Swiss strategist Antoine-Henri Jomini, Mahan argued for three cornerstones 
in an overall naval strategy.  First, concentration of forces allowed a power to 
overwhelm an adversary.  Second, geographical position and a direction of attack to 
neutralize an enemy’s response were crucial to success.  Finally, a close relationship 
between logistical support and combat elements was essential for success.liv 
Using these three elements, Mahan promulgated the idea of seapower, and the 
link between naval war and national policy.  Possession of a strong navy allowed for 
lucrative commercial enterprises, and lucrative commercial enterprises funded strong 
navies.  Mahan concluded that being a great power meant that you had to be a country 
with considerable seapower.  And the relationship between battles at sea and the 
pursuit of a national end are inextricably linked.lv 
In order to attain seapower, a fleet functioned as an offensive weapon.  
According to Mahan, it should be used wherever possible, “and War, once declared, 
must be waged offensively, aggressively. The enemy must not be fended off, but 
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smitten down.”lvi And although fleet action could be decisive, a single cataclysmic 
battle would not necessarily defeat an enemy.  A blockade could strangle an enemy by 
reducing its seapower to the point where weakness and lethargy force a capitulation.lvii 
These fundamental concepts permeated the curriculum of the Naval War 
College, and had an immediate impact on national policy.  Shortly after Mahan’s arrival 
at the Naval War College, Congress authorized the construction of a group of ships 
known as the “ABCD Ships” (Atlanta, Boston, Chicago and Dolphin), and then six 
months later, authorized three more sea going battleships.lviii  And, Mahan’s influence 
extended beyond the realm of maritime and naval strategy.  According to historians 
and contemporary critics, he was the most prominent author of his contemporary time 
who clearly proved the importance of historical analysis during a period of 
extraordinary technological change.lix 
In addition to Mahan, Julian Corbett also produced a body of knowledge 
attempting to persuade readers that a systematic approach to seapower was essential to 
success.  Unlike Mahan, Corbett had no practical experience as a naval officer.  Born in 
England, he was educated as a lawyer, but retained an interest in maritime topics.  He 
wrote some short articles on naval history which were published and caught the 
attention of the British Admiralty.  This enabled him to lecture occasionally at the Royal 
Naval War College in Greenwich, England.  After the publishing of his renown work, 
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Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Corbett worked directly for the British Admiralty 
during World War I. 
Similar to Mahan, Corbett reflected on the relationship between naval war and 
national policy.  However, Corbett made a distinction between a government with a 
strong land-based power and a government with a strong sea-based power, effectively 
stating that one could be great without the other.  This assertion directly challenged 
Mahan, a contemporary of Corbett’s.  Corbett  noted that an enemy might be able to 
stay out of range, and therefore could not be destroyed.  This meant that concentration 
was not a golden rule in naval warfare.  Also, since a fleet might not be able to be 
destroyed, the real target should be the sea commerce of the nation.  If you destroy the 
ability to procure wealth, the enemy will captitulate.lx 
Both Mahan and Corbett knew each other, and both men were influenced by the 
writings of the other.  They shared many similarities and some fundamental differences.  
As historians, they differed in their approaches and methods.  While Mahan’s assertions 
found their support from secondary sources, Corbett’s ideas were deductions from 
primary sources.lxi  With these two men forming the base of subsequent maritime 
strategies, maritime nations tried to develop approaches to controlling the world’s 
oceans for their benefit.  The United States used these two thinkers as a foundation for 
its naval strategy. 
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Historically, the naval strategy of the United States Navy falls into several 
different categories.  These different strategies can be attributed to respective 
contemporary political and technological environments.  The “continental” phase 
existed from 1776 until the 1890’s when the US Navy maintained a relatively weak 
presence on the world’s oceans.  Then, the acquisition of American overseas colonies 
and burgeoning technological advances heralded the “oceanic” phase when politicians 
and military commanders embraced the Mahanian and Corbettian ideals of seapower.    
This oceanic period includes the period through World War II when the United States 
became the undisputed champion of the world’s oceans.  The post-1945 world saw the 
end of this phase, and the introduction of the “transoceanic” period.lxii  
The transoceanic period adequately describes the current strategic posture of the 
American Navy.   Like its predecessors, the transoceanic period metamorphosed in 
response to changing political and technological circumstances.  However, two distinct 
periods straddle the transoceanic period.  Between 1945 and 1990, a focus on “blue-
water” (i.e. open ocean) operations characterized the deployment of forces.  After 1990, 
the in-shore or littoral environment dominated the thinking of naval commanders. 
The transoceanic blue-water period embraced a new focus on the job of the US 
Navy relative to World War II.  Command of the sea was paramount, but the threat of a 
worthy adversary had vanished at the conclusion of the war.  Only Great Britain and 
the Soviet Union posed any threat to the United States on the high seas, and most 
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believed it would be unlikely that Great Britain would attempt an aggressive war in the 
near future.lxiii   With the Soviet Union as a likely adversary, naval planners focused on 
developing a new approach to naval strategy, an approach that would assume a conflict 
in open ocean environments. 
This assumption of open ocean combat was a result of the geographical 
disposition of the two adversaries.  The United States enjoyed significant water barriers 
(Atlantic and Pacific Oceans) that had to be crossed by potential adversaries.  In order 
to defend the country, hostile forces would be intercepted long before they approached 
the coastlines of the country.  The Soviet Union’s geography also contributed to the idea 
of the blue water strategy.  Although the coastline of the USSR was significant, the vast 
majority included areas difficult to navigate all twelve months of the year.  Add these 
two geographical situations with the political climate of the post-World War II era, and 
a blue water strategy becomes the most likely strategic approach.  And, the Soviet naval 
buildup only served to confirm the assumptions of the military planners.  
Since the turn of the eighteenth century, Russians and their Soviet descendants 
sought to create and maintain a fleet of combatant ships.  The success of European 
powers in maritime commerce motivated Peter the Great to prioritize a presence on 
world oceans.    In the decades following World War II, the Soviet Union renewed this 
approach, launching a building campaign that created the largest navy in the world 
(based on number of ships.) It built more than 2,500 merchant ships and was second 
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only to Panama in terms of ships registered.  Its fishing fleet placed second only to 
Japan, and its oceanographic research fleet dwarfed other fleets, attaining a size larger 
than the rest of the world combined.  By all measurements in 1970, the Soviet Union 
attained the status of the most powerful sea power in the world.lxiv 
This situation alarmed the United States.  America had also constructed a 
massive fleet, but decades earlier.  During World War II to meet the needs of a two-
theater war, US shipyards turned out massive amounts of tonnage.  After the Pacific 
fleet was nearly annihilated during the Pearl Harbor attack and the Atlantic merchant 
fleet suffered massive losses due to U-boat activity in the Atlantic, shipbuilders turned 
out large numbers of combatant and non-combatant ships.  By early 1943, shipyards 
were launching 1.5 million tons more per month than the total lost to Axis forces.  The 
majority of the new construction provided the base of the American navy in the three 
decades following the Second World War.lxv  
In the middle to late twentieth century, the forces of the US Navy were arrayed 
against the formidable threat of the Soviet Navy.  This was not an easy task.  In the post 
World War II world, budgets for the US Navy followed the pattern evident in history:  
funding varied dramatically.  Many conflicting requirements (deployments to Korea 
and Vietnam as well as modernization) nearly brought the navy to its knees in terms of 
readiness.  At the conclusion of the Vietnam War, the US Navy was not in a good 
position to match the burgeoning Soviet blue-water forces.  lxvi 
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Paradoxically, the struggle of the US Navy in the post World War II world can be 
attributed to its exemplary record during the war.  The destruction of the Japanese 
Navy and the power of the atomic bomb had many members of Congress considering 
the elimination of a navy fleet altogether.  Their reasoning centered on the fact that 
there was no enemy to fight, and that atomic bombs made large ships obsolete.  Why 
should you pay for large carriers when you can have fleets of B-36 bombers equipped 
with nuclear weapons?  In this environment, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
found himself fighting for the very survival of the navy. 
In academic and intellectual circles, historians and strategists attempted to raise 
awareness of the growing Soviet threat.  In 1954, Admiral Robert B. Carney noted in a 
speech to the Naval War College that “we cannot exclude that Russia will in time build 
carriers. The Russian Navy is the one Soviet service which is more heavily manned than 
in World War II.”lxvii However, even though there was clear evidence that a navy was 
an important part of foreign policy and national defense, the navy was allowed to 
deteriorate during this period. 
The value of the navy was obvious to some, especially after several world crises 
required quick response on the part of American military forces.  In these cases, only 
the US Navy was prepared to respond quickly.  One of the best examples involves the 
Korean War.  Naval assets from carriers were the only forces able to provide support to 
the beleaguered forces defending South Korea, and the Seventh Fleet was the only thing 
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preventing Communist China from invading Taiwan. This changed the views ofsome 
supporters of the Air Force overnight. lxviii  However, many viewpoints were not 
changed.  The proponents of eliminating the Navy would need more convincing. 
The convincing would come in the first part of the 1970’s.  The degradation of US 
naval assets became painfully apparent during the waning years of conflict in Southeast 
Asia.  During the Vietnam War, the US Navy was forced to operate World War II-era 
ships for long periods of deployment. For example in January 1969, nearly sixty percent 
of US ships were more than twenty years old, while the figure for the Soviet Navy was 
less than one percent.lxix  Morale and readiness reached new lows.   With an outdated 
fleet, low morale, and dearth of funds, facing the Soviet Union in a maritime conflict 
looked bleak.    
While American assets were allowed to decay in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the Soviet 
Union pursued a different path.   In 1954, the USSR made plans to build a significant 
number of naval ships designed to operate beyond the coastal waters.lxx   By the 1970’s, 
it was clear that the Soviet Union would be the primary adversary, and that the theater 
of operations would most likely be in the open ocean environment.  Adhering to the 
Mahanian principles, sea control appeared even more important as control of the sea 
lanes to Europe would be absolutely necessary to defend NATO forces against a 
possible Warsaw Pact attack.  These “blue water” tactics dictated that US Navy units 
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would operate far from land, and they would need every available tool to provide an 
advantage against their Soviet counterparts.   
In the 1970’s and 1980’s, the US Navy focused on this blue water threat of the 
Soviet Union.   This approach appeared in a publication entitled “The Maritime 
Strategy”, a classified document from the Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 
William Small, and distributed throughout the US Navy in 1984.lxxi  “The Maritime 
Strategy” was presented as a series of stages in dealing with the Soviet Union.  The 
example presented to Congress utilized an invasion of Norway as a test case.  During 
Phase I, a deterrent phase, NATO and US Navy assets would deploy quickly to the 
region and encourage the Soviets not to further the war.  Phase II involved striking 
back, that “the best defense is a good offense”, and the forward deployment of 
submarines and surface-vessels.  The final phase would be to bring the war to the 
enemy’s homeland and bring terms favorable to the United States and NATO.lxxii 
This strategy required substantial naval assets, and the leadership of Secretary of 
the Navy John Lehman secured considerable support from Congress and President 
Ronald Reagan.  The 1980’s was a period of US naval growth, and the realization of a 
600 ship fleet.  Fiscal expenditures for the Navy in 1983 were $82 billion dollars 
compared to $108 billion dollars in 1989.lxxiii   But, these expenditures and the strategy 
they supported would drastically change in the 1990’s.   
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On Christmas Day 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as the leader of the USSR, 
and turned his responsibilities over to Boris Yeltsin, the president of Russia.  This 
marked not only the end of the political entity, but the end of the military entity as well.  
As the break up of the Soviet Union progressed, military assets were distributed among 
the various nations and the once formidable navy that faced the US Navy no longer 
existed.  This required a massive change in strategic outlook for American forces, and 
this change manifested itself in a posture statement entitled “From the Sea” 
“From the Sea” first appeared in the Navy News Service on September 30, 1992.  
This statement of strategy departed significantly from the prevailing approach in the 
1980’s.  Taking into account the changes in world politics, this strategy focused on 
dealing with several regional conflicts rather than a global war between two 
superpowers.  “This strategic direction, derived from the National Security Strategy, 
represents a fundamental shift away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward 
joint operation conducted from the sea.”  The Navy needs “to concentrate more on 
capabilities required in the complex operating environment of the  ‘littoral’ or coastlines 
of the earth.”lxxiv 
The change in strategy from blue water to littoral operations shifted the focus of 
METOC.  Instead of providing forecasts covering large open ocean areas, the more 
complex littoral regions would need to be examined in detail.  This fundamental change 
has encouraged new approaches to forecasting and to forecasters.   
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The shift from open ocean environment to littoral areas is significant from 
several different perspectives.   In the open ocean environment, the meteorological and 
oceanographic variables are relatively simple compared to the variables of the littoral 
zone.  Air and water masses in the blue water environment tend toward uniformity.  
The variables at work in that environment differ greatly from those present in the 
littoral environment due to the proximity of land. 
In the open ocean regions, the sun’s radiation heats the water at a rate that is 
partially dependent on the characteristics of the water mass.  However, in the littoral 
environment, land and water are in close proximity.  Land and water absorb radiation 
from the sun at different rates which creates a much more complex environmental 
forecasting environment.lxxv 
For example, unlike the open ocean, topography significantly influences local 
conditions.  Specific terrain features can generate thunderstorms and other phenomena 
such as lenticular clouds and standing mountain waves.  The temperature difference 
between the ocean and land create offshore and onshore winds depending on the time 
of day.  Beach profiles change according to the season, and currents are significantly 
affected by underwater topography.  Density differences between fresh and salt water 
create a complicated environment where different temperatures and salinity levels 
drastically alter the characteristics of the water column.lxxvi  All of the factors described 
above can impact the deployment of vehicles, personnel, and weapons systems. 
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Due to this change from blue water to littoral operations, METOC needed to 
adjust its operations.  New forecasting products, new technologies and new training 
practices characterize the latter part of the 1990’s at METOC.  Although these changes 
are significant, adaptation to new challenges is an old theme in the Navy.  The METOC 
community has been able to adapt to every challenge faced, and they have faced similar 
challenges like the change to littoral environments. 
  At the outbreak of World War II hostilities on 1 September 1939, METOC 
leadership in the Navy consisted of Lt. Commander Wilbert “Red” Lockhart with a staff 
of only three support personnel.lxxvii  Lockhart had become known as the Navy’s most 
capable meteorologist in a short period of time.  Throughout several duty rotations, 
Lockhart had won the confidence of his superiors, right up to the Commander in Chief 
of the U.S. Fleet by presenting meteorological reports that were utilized with great 
success in the field.  Examples include the use of upper-level wind reports to direct 
gunfire from battleships, and the forecasting of Santa Ana winds in the conduct of fleet 
battle exercises.lxxviii 
The major problem facing Lockhart revolved around the distribution of data to 
navy stations and ships in a wartime situation where fleet protocols specified radio 
silence.  Lockhart put together a task force to solve the problem, and the solution 
developed created a central information center where data would be collected and 
products would be issued.  This concept of the “weather central” was put to use 
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immediately, and the navy established two weather centrals, one for the Atlantic based 
in Washington, and the other for the Pacific based in San Francisco.lxxix 
As the organization began to take shape, the next key requirement involved 
staffing the mushrooming meteorological requirements of the Navy.  Requirements 
dictated 1,800 additional naval meteorology officers, and these college-educated 
candidates were recruited, commissioned, and sent to one of five universities for a crash 
course in graduate-level meteorology. lxxx  These five universities (University of 
Chicago, UCLA, CA Institute of Technology, MIT, NYU) as well as the Army Air Force 
Tactical Training Command (TTC) at Grand Rapids, MI were responsible for training all 
the meteorological officers for the Navy and the Army Air Force.lxxxi 
When the Navy began to recruit qualified officers, it realized that there was a 
major shortfall for meteorology positions.  In order to meet demand, the Navy tapped a 
new pool of previously unconsidered candidates:  women.  Encouraged by the 
following communication from the Department of Commerce, the Navy’s WAVES 
(Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service) program expanded to include 
meteorological officers. 
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It is apparent that increasing difficulty will be experienced in securing qualified 
persons to fill many of the positions essential to the prosecution of the National 
Defense Program.  As one means of meeting this situation, appointment officers 
who have been in the habit of requesting the certification of male eligibles [sic] 
only for certain positions are urged to explore the possibilities of employing 
women….Surveys have demonstrated that women can satisfactorily perform 
almost all kinds of work that men can perform.lxxxii  
Although only approximately 100 women were ever trained for meteorological 
positions, their placement at stateside locations allowed the WAVES to free up men for 
deployment in overseas positions. 
After being commissioned as ensigns, Navy personnel attended one of the five 
universities training officers for meteorological positions.  This was the reverse of the 
Army’s approach, which dictated that candidates complete their meteorological 
training prior to becoming commissioned as second lieutenants.lxxxiii  In either case, 
meteorological education was interspersed with military drills and training.  Students 
even managed to combine the two disciplines.  Instead of counting “Hup, two, three, 
four” in drills, the meteorological candidates chanted “Bjerknes, Bjerknes, Bergeron, 
Solberg”. This was in reference to the men who advanced the idea of fronts—cold, 
warm, and occluded. lxxxiv 
In response to the need for weather forecasting, the armed services launched a 
massive effort that produced men and women trained in the science of meteorology.  
They learned from the most distinguished instructors in America, and brought their 
experience to the war effort.  The shortfall in qualified applicants also provided an 
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opportunity for women to serve their country in a critical role.  With this training, 
meteorologists contributed significantly to the war effort, playing a vital role in the 
conduct of naval operations, especially flight operations in World War II.   
In the decades following World War II, fundamental shifts occurred in the 
structure of the Navy’s meteorological staff.  Originally known as the Aerology Branch, 
the changing needs of the Navy dictated structural changes.  In 1957, the Naval Weather 
Service Division was formed, which elevated the status of meteorology in the navy 
from a branch of naval aviation, to a full divisional status.  This helped reorient the 
weather assets from a mostly aviation focus, to a fleet-wide focus.lxxxv   
This fleet-wide focus and the new threat of the Soviet Navy necessitated a shift in 
the types of information needed by military planners.  Moving away from the local 
forecasts seen in previous case studies (especially World War II), navy meteorologists 
needed enough data to provide accurate products to serve a variety of needs.  These 
needs included forecasts for large ocean areas including both meteorological and 
oceanographic data.  This was a particularly difficult task because weather and 
oceanographic observations were minimal in those regions.  In response to this new 
task, the Navy sought to extend its data gathering and information processing 
capabilities.  These developments in data gathering and data processing will be covered 
in the next chapter. 
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With a need to provide more information to more people, the Navy merged its 
oceanography and meteorology branches in 1976 at the Stennis Space Center in 
Mississippi.  This enabled the different branches to work together and combine 
resources to gather, process and disseminate the vital information to the forces of the 
US Navy.   
In order to ensure the timely flow of information, the Navy maintains two 
production centers where supercomputers and centralized data reporting provide 
information to seven Fleet Support Centers throughout the world.  The Fleet Support 
Centers provide the forecasts to naval units and other armed services within specific 
regions of responsibility.  The Navy also maintains several detachments, which focus on 
METOC products within a very localized area.  For example, a detachment in Naples, 
Italy, supports naval operations in the central Mediterranean Sea, and the Adriatic 
Sea.lxxxvi 
In addition to making adjustments in the deployment of assets in response to the 
changing nature of METOC operations, there has also been a fundamental change in the 
weapons used by naval forces.  The changes in ordnance necessitated changes in the 
types of information provided by forecasters to naval personnel.  These precision 
guided munitions (PGM) have dramatically altered the role of METOC staff.  
The weapons utilized by the Navy have changed dramatically with the advent of 
smart technologies.  While most ordnance during World War Two could be described 
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as “dumb”, subsequent technologies enabled manufacturers to produce PGM weapons.  
These PGM’s have made the job of the weather forecaster more important than during 
previous eras of weapons development.  Now, commanders in the field rely even more 
on the products of the METOC staff. 
The Navy’s arsenal before the advent of smart technology relied on guidance 
systems that were calibrated and set before the launch of the weapon.  For example, a 
bomb dropped from an aircraft was released when the bombardier sighted the target 
through an aiming device (bomb sight) on the plane.  Naval gunfire was also directed 
by human observers and mechanical ship-based gun sights which fed information to 
the gunnery officers who made settings based on this information.  In either case, once 
the weapon was released or fired, there was no other input other than wind that would 
impact the direction of the explosive. 
World War Two provided a key point in naval weapons development.  US Navy 
forces experienced the pitfalls of faulty ordinance with the multitude of torpedoes that 
failed to detonate on target.  These experiences led to the prioritization of weapons 
development and production.  In response to this situation, the Office of Scientific 
Research and Development (OSRD) directly developed or funded most of the war’s 
innovations in weaponry.lxxxvii  Innovations from this office drastically improved the 
arsenal available to the Navy and the rest of America’s armed forces.  This same entity 
also provided the technological assistance in development of the first PGM’s.  Although 
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it was officially disbanded after World War II, the can-do spirit of the OSRD scientists 
and workers permeated those organizations that employed them.  Examples of 
organizations that hired the thinkers of OSRD included Lockheed, Hughes, and the 
Naval Ordnance Test Station-which eventually became known as China Lake Naval 
Weapons center. 
These organizations heralded the first smart weapons used by American forces.  
The first truly guided weapon, code-named Falcon, addressed the problem of Soviet 
bombers armed with nuclear weapons.  With the ability for one nuclear bomb to 
devastate an entire metropolitan area, the US Air Force needed a weapon that could 
eliminate a bomber threat.  In 1947, Hughes Corporation began researching the 
feasibility of an air to air missile, guided by radar, to neutralize the Soviet bomber 
threat.  This was the beginning of the modern PGM.lxxxviii   Because US forces were 
largely responsible for offensive air operations during the Korean conflict and 
exclusively responsible during the Vietnam War, the US established a lead in the 
development of PGM munitions.lxxxix  These smart weapons now form the bulk of the 
ordnance used by America’s armed forces, including the US Navy. 
The weapons utilized by today’s modern Navy are diverse and deadly.   
Although there are many different types of ordnance, groups of them share similarities 
that will highlight how weather affects their deployment.  The sensing systems that 
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guide ordinance to their target include: infrared guided weapons, acoustically guided 
weapons, GPS guided weapons, and television guided weapons. 
The Harpoon is the oldest PGM currently deployed in the Navy’s arsenal.  The 
Harpoon missile first appeared on drawing boards in 1971.  McDonnell Douglas 
(Boeing) received approval from the Navy to begin developing an anti-ship missile with 
a range of 70 nm.  This weapon was eventually deployed in 1977, and utilized aircraft, 
ships and submarines as launching platforms.  The Harpoon guides itself to the target 
by using a variety of systems depending on the model of the missile.    In a typical 
scenario, the Harpoon is launched along the bearing to the target.  At a predetermined 
point, the weapon activates its seeking radar, and scans for the objective approximately 
45˚ to each side of its course.  If it cannot find a target, it executes a predetermined 
search pattern.  If still no target is found, the missile self-destructs.  Upgrades to the 
weapon’s guidance system include an infrared imaging system, electro-optical 
(television) guidance, and a Global Positioning System (GPS.)xc 
Another anti-ship smart weapon is the MK-48 torpedo.  It is deployed aboard the 
Navy’s submarine fleet, and selected surface ships involved in anti-submarine warfare.  
This weapon is launched on a bearing towards the target, and uses two guidance 
systems.  Initially, a wire trails behind the torpedo, which provides direct information 
from sensors and computers from the firing platform.  The second guidance method 
relies on a combination of passive and active sonar units, which guide the torpedo to its 
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target.xci  Sonar guidance relies on sound, with passive units detecting the sounds of the 
target in the water, and active units which send out signals which bounce off the target. 
The third class of weapons involves ordinance delivered on target via laser 
designation.  The Guided Bomb Unit (GBU) 27/28, one of many laser-guided weapons, 
deploys from an aircraft, and seeks its target by following a laser that is provided by 
personnel on the ground, or by another aircraft.  The personnel on the ground use 
specially equipped binoculars to sight the target, then “paint” the target with a laser.  
Aircraft use a specially mounted target designator controlled by the pilot which 
effectively designates the target.  This does not have to be the parent aircraft of the 
bomb.  The reflected laser is picked up by the GBU 27/28, and the bomb is released, 
following the reflected laser to the target.xcii   
The new technologies utilized in PGM’s have provided a large degree of 
flexibility to those deploying the ordinance against enemy targets.  However, because of 
their different guidance systems, commanders must choose carefully the ordinance that 
will be used against targets.  Unlike World War II, Korea, and the Vietnam Conflict, the 
military decision maker needs to know more about the environmental conditions before 
making a decision. 
Although infrared imaging systems like those used on the Harpoon allow the 
weapon to be operated at night, there are environmental limitations, based on weather 
conditions, that must be considered.  In the case of infrared detection systems, sensors 
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rely on Wien’s Law, which states that objects of different temperature radiate energy at 
different wavelengths.  Using this law, sensors are able to distinguish among objects of 
different temperatures.  However, water vapor (e.g. clouds ) absorbs a great deal of 
infrared radiation, which can wreak havoc on infrared imaging systems.xciii   Command 
staff personnel must know the expected cloud cover over targets to make judgements 
on the appropriate weapon guidance system. The following table summarizes the 
limiting environmental factors of PGM’s: 
Figure 2: Environmental Variables Impacting Precision Guided Munitionsxciv 
PGM System Environmental Limitations 
Electro-optical Clouds, Haze, Sun Angle, 
Precipitation, Light Levels 
Infrared Clouds (esp. Fog), Haze, Aerosols, 
Sun angle, Precipitation, Light 
Levels 
Laser Clouds, Haze, Absolute Humidity 
GPS Wind Direction and Speed, 
Turbulence 
Microwave (radar) Clouds (moisture-laden), 
Precipitation 
 
In most cases, if you cannot see the target, your guidance system is ineffective.  
For example, during the 1991 Gulf War, laser guided munitions had great difficulty 
operating in even sparse cloud cover.  Even if the target could be seen intermittently 
from the air, the laser seeker on the weapon could not re-establish lock on the target 
after passing through clouds.xcv   Fog, clouds, haze, humidity, wind and dust storms 
    46 
(including battle induced dust) all limit the ability of sensor systems to guide their 
payload to target.xcvi 
In addition to the air weapons launched from ships and aircraft, the PGM 
technologies utilized by the sonar units onboard torpedoes rely heavily on 
environmental factors.  The acoustic properties of the oceans determine the 
performance characteristics of the sonar units.  The velocity of propagation of a sound 
wave in the oceans depends on temperature, salinity and pressure.  These variables 
change based on geographical location, the time of day, and depth of operations.  
Therefore, the characteristics of sound change from place to place and from day to 
day.xcvii 
Submarine and surface ships often exploit variations in temperature, pressure 
and salinity when using SONAR detection.  Thermoclines, or regions of large 
temperature change in relatively short distances can provide barriers to sound 
propagation.  This enables submarines to hide from SONAR detection behind layers.  
These layers of ocean waters also prevent sound waves from traveling in straight lines.  
They undergo significant refraction according to Snell’s Law, which states that energy 
passing though two different mediums (i.e. waters of different temperatures and 
salinity) will bend.  Other factors which also affect SONAR include the topography and 
composition of the bottom, the surface conditions, and the ambient noise of the ocean 
environment. xcviii 
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In order to operate at maximum detection ranges, operators are able to calibrate 
their SONAR equipment.  While submarines have sensors on their hull which give 
them instantaneous information about bathymetric conditions, surface ships and 
aircraft utilize expendable probes that relay essential information to detection and 
weapons systems.  METOC also manages ASWEPS, the Antisubmarine Warfare 
Environmental Prediction System.  This system collects information world wide and 
attempts to predict oceanographic conditions in order to support the operations of 
antisubmarine warfare units.xcix  However, this is a very difficult task.  “The ocean 
environment, an inhomogeneous variable and noisy medium, is often unpredictable 
and certainly variable both in space and time.”c 
The use of precision guided weapons has impacted the way that wars are 
conducted.  This change in weaponry has required a change in the products generated 
by METOC, and this change in products requires a change in the training of the 
personnel tasked with providing the correct tools to military decision makers.  Similar 
to the challenges faced in World War II, the training regimen for weather personnel has 
adapted to the new requirements.   
METOC personnel require a high degree of training and education.  Today, more 
than one third of the Ph.D.’s in the Navy reside in METOC positions.  A high level of 
education is necessary down to the entry level Aerographer’s Mate.  Today, there is a 
layered training system designed for new recruits and veteran METOC personnel.   
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Initial training for enlisted personnel (Aerographer’s Mates) commences with 
“A” school.  This level, originally termed “observer school”, seeks to make expert 
weather observers.  Here, students start with basic weather terminology, and advance 
through many different levels of sophistication, including satellite analysis courses.  The 
next level, “C” school, involves drawing conclusions from data and making forecasts.  
Officers attend BOATS, or Basic Oceanography Accession Training program, which 
seeks to combine both schools in a condensed format.ci 
These programs have changed to meet the needs of METOC, including the 
proliferation of high technology.  Most of the training schools are now attempting to 
“forecast on the glass.” Forecasting on the glass refers to the computer monitor and the 
gradual phasing out of paper as a medium for presenting forecasts.   By October 2002, 
the Navy hopes to have six electronic classrooms to provide METOC students with the 
tools needed to train the way they fight. cii 
In addition to the recent push for more electronic teaching aids, there has been a 
significant push to retrain METOC personnel to address the shift to littoral 
environments.  In 1989, COMET (Cooperative Program of Operational Meteorology, 
Education and Training) was established.  This organization, operated by University 
Corporation of Atmospheric Research (UCAR), sponsored by NOAA, and funded by 
the National Weather Service, the Air Force Weather Agency and NMOC, seeks to 
improve meteorology education and training in the United States.     
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COMET’s educational content reaches Department of Defense students in two 
ways.  The National Weather Service conducts resident courses at sponsor institutions, 
or via a combination of CD-ROM and World Wide Web sites.  Current curriculum 
includes courses dealing with COAMPS (mesoscale model), Satellite Meteorology, 
Short-term Forecasting (Nowcasting), and Hydrometeorology.  Many of these focus on 
the conditions in the littoral environment.ciii  
As the strategy of the US Navy shifted from a blue-water focus to a concentration 
in littoral spaces, naval operations entered a more complex meteorological and 
oceanographic environment.  This fact coupled with the more weather sensitive smart 
weapons has underscored the importance of assessing and predicting environmental 
factors significant to naval operations.  As weapons technology proliferates, and more 
countries have access to sophisticated weapons, any advantage that US forces can 
exploit becomes even more significant.  One of these advantages manifests itself in the 
accurate forecasting by METOC personnel.  This requires that personnel be well-
equipped and well-trained, and the Navy has taken steps to ensure the quality of 
METOC personnel. 
Technological innovation has been one of the most important factors driving 
meteorology.  Advances in computers and satellites have dramatically altered the 
science of meteorological prediction.  For example, the most powerful computers in the 
world are currently being used for atmospheric research due to the nature and 
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complexity of the Earth’s environment.  And, satellites tasked with providing data 
about terrestrial weather now provide both increased resolution and volume of data to 
weather researchers.  Technology has dramatically altered weather prediction, and the 
job of METOC. 
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Chapter Three:  How Technology has Changed Forecasting 
In the middle to late twentieth century, technological innovation improved the 
ability of meteorologists and oceanographers to predict environmental conditions.  
These technological innovations included advances in numerical weather prediction,  
and data collection.  Advances such as these allowed METOC personnel to dramatically 
alter the products offered to the naval community.  With more good, hard data 
processed in a timely fashion, more accurate forecasts have disseminated efficiently 
throughout the Navy.   
Although many technological improvements have made weather forecasting 
more accurate, numerical weather prediction (NWP) and the computer technology that 
enables the processing of NWP models remains the most significant advent in weather 
prediction.  Numerical weather prediction generates forecasts through the use of a 
computer.  Mathematical models of the atmosphere describe meteorological conditions 
and the multitude of variables impacting the weather.  The models do not represent an 
exact state, but an approximation of conditions.  By entering values into the equation 
(values such as temperature, dew point, wind speed, etc.), the computer predicts 
atmospheric conditions for a very short time interval (approximately six minutes) at 
certain locations called grid points.   
These grid points are evenly spaced points on the map, and their relative 
distance (resolution) is determined by the needs of the forecast.  For example, if a very 
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detailed forecast with closely spaced grid points is required, programmers increase 
computational time to provide greater resolution.  However, the trade off for grid 
points that are spaced further apart is reduced computer time.civ  This relationship 
between grid points and computational time is important in the next step of the process.  
By taking the results of the computations and entering them into the model again, one 
can see what the atmosphere might look like in twelve minutes.  By repeating this 
process,  approximations of weather conditions for twelve, thirty-six, or even forty-eight 
hours in the future are generated.cv 
Numerical weather prediction was derived by Lewis Fry Richardson while 
working for a company that built dams.  In 1922, he published a book entitled Weather 
Prediction by Numerical Process, in which he proposed seven equations that would 
completely determine the behavior of the atmosphere given its initial state.cvi  Even 
though these equations could be solved, two major problems existed:  data collection 
and speed of calculation.  Enough data would have to be collected at the same time, 
from many different locations and many different altitudes.  And, once all the numbers 
were collected, a quick way to execute the calculations was needed.  The ability to 
gather and process this information in the first half of the twentieth century was 
limited.  Richardson took six weeks to compute the weather (by hand!) for only two 
grid points during a six hour period (0400 to 1000 on 20 May 1910)cvii, not a useful 
solution to predict weather.  
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World War II had a dramatic effect on the two major problems of data collection 
and executing calculations.  Since meteorological data was needed by all branches of the 
Allied forces, new standardization agreements on taking and recording weather 
observations evolved.  Ships, planes and land stations reported their meteorological 
observations in a standard format.  For the first time, the expansion of the observational 
network allowed a three-dimensional data gathering and analysis.cviii  In addition to 
observations, planners centralized the collection of weather data into locations called 
weather centrals. This meant that large amounts of data were now available for 
computation. 
The problem of data calculation became prominent after observations became 
available due to the changes described above.  Punch cards were used to store and 
calculate data, and their use soared in World War II by an order of magnitude to almost 
80 million cards.cix  However, the machines using punch cards lacked the speed to be 
useful in the prediction of weather. 
Between 1945 and 1955, advances in the marriage of computer technology to 
meteorology enabled meteorologists to make daily forecasts that were rapid and more 
accurate.  John Von Neuman and Jules Charney directed a project at Princeton 
University that focused on the computational problems and algorithmic design.  By 
borrowing time on ENIAC, an Army computer located at the Aberdeen Proving 
Grounds in MD, new methods emerged that resulted in the viability of numerical 
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weather prediction.  As computing power grew in the 1950’s many meteorologists 
turned to Richardson’s methods.cx 
In the 1950’s computers functioned as a research tool, but by the 1960’s hundreds 
of new computers were marketed by at least eighty different manufacturers, all with 
increasing amounts of memory, disk space, and processing power.cxi  These spectacular 
advances led to the widespread adoption of the computer as a meteorological 
instrument.cxii  As computers advanced, METOC staff (and others) developed more 
sophisticated numerical weather prediction software to model the atmosphere. 
Computers and the associated changes in data transmission and gathering 
pushed numerical weather prediction into the mainstream of meteorology.   The shift to 
numerical weather prediction in the late 50’s and early 60’s was the result of four 
separate factors.  First, the computer industry made the jump to digital communication 
instead of analog.  Second, data transmissions could be made in the megabit scale; third, 
satellites could fill in large gaps in weather observations.  Finally, processing power of 
computers increased nearly 200% in the ten years between 1955 and 1965.cxiii  By 1961, 
the navy established a Fleet Numerical Weather Facility in Washington, DC, which 
purchased its own CDC-1604 computer to enable the processing of weather models.  
As computer hardware and software progressed, new models developed to keep 
pace with the technological change.  Between 1965 and 1980, advances in computer 
technology promulgated a multitude of models with varying levels of resolution.  
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Examples include NOGAPS, NCEP Spectral, MM5, ETA, COAMPS, ECMWF, and JMA.  
Of these, two have emerged in the past ten years as the primary backbone of forecasting 
in the Navy, and all the armed forces.  Although the Army and Air Force retain weather 
units, the Navy provides the major modeling due to the computing power at its data 
processing centers. 
The Navy Operational Global Atmospheric Prediction System (NOGAPS), 
developed by the Naval Research Laboratory in 1982, provides global weather guidance 
for all branches of the Department of Defense.  Applications for NOGAPS include 
ballistic missile targeting inputs, ocean circulation models, and military aircraft routing 
maps.  It also functions as a major weather site for the civilian community.  The public 
domain NOGAPS web address with weather data for the entire globe receives 
approximately 3,000,000 hits per day. cxiv 
Since its inception in 1982, NOGAPS resolution has increased in parallel with the 
processing power of the hardware running the NOGAPS software.  Until 2000, a Cray 
supercomputer with 16 processors hosted NOGAPS, providing horizontal resolutions 
of approximately 150 km.  In 2001, the Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography 
Center (FNMOC) in Monterey, CA, successfully upgraded its computer hardware from 
a Cray supercomputer to a Silicon Graphics platform with a 512 processor system.  This 
system provides more than thirty-three times the processing of the Cray system, and 
dramatically improved the output of the NOGAPS model.  For example, instead of 150 
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km resolution, the NOGAPS model can attain under 50 km resolution in certain 
geographical locations.cxv 
With the increased resolution, NOGAPS can provide accurate worldwide 
forecasts anywhere on the globe.  However, the Navy has made changes in its areas of 
operations by shifting to littoral environments.  The change to these littoral in-shore 
operations has necessitated forecasts with even greater resolutions.  This encouraged 
the development of the Coupled Ocean/Atmosphere Mesoscale Prediction System 
(COAMPS).  Like NOGAPS, COAMPS was developed by the Naval Research 
Laboratory, and it achieved operational status in December 1997.  However, it differs 
significantly from NOGAPS and the other global-scale models available to forecasters.  
First, it is a regional mesoscale (weather phenomena less than 100km in size ) model 
with the ability to vary the resolution by creating nested grids.   Second, it can be 
located anywhere in the world where high resolution weather modeling is required.  
Finally, the model contains a high-resolution geographic database that is used in the 
creation of products.cxvi 
The COAMPS model runs at FNMOC, and it can also run on a UNIX based 
computer in the local area.  It takes standard weather inputs, including NOGAPS 
output, ship observations, pilot observations, and a multitude of remote sensing 
systems and runs them through a quality control algorithm before processing the data. 
cxvii  With this data, COAMPS presents local conditions to military planners with 
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incredibly small resolutions.  In some cases, COAMPS has been run with resolutions 
finer than 1 km.cxviii 
The small resolution enables METOC personnel to make more accurate forecasts 
for refractivity, turbulence forecasts for aircraft, and first-order transport predictions for 
contaminants.  This is especially important to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
planning, either defensive or offensive.  As long as the approximate location of the 
source of the WMD is known, accurate calculation of the dispersal and effectiveness 
patterns is possible.cxix 
NOGAPS and COAMPS support the ability of the METOC staff to provide 
accurate information.  However, these models are only computer programs which rely 
completely on the data entered into their programs.  Another important advancement 
involves the amount and quality of data funneled to the data processing centers tasked 
with executing these models. 
Because of the changing role of naval forces in the post World War II era, the 
Navy realized it would need to generate more accurate forecasts.  To support this task, 
there was an immediate movement to increase the data available to its staff.  
Specifically, the Navy sought data from locations where no observations were 
previously available.   One of the first programs designed to accumulate remote data on 
weather phenomena was established in 1951.cxx  The Navy Ice Observation program 
initiated flights across the Arctic regions in cooperation with Canadian researchers.  
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These observers not only recorded ice pack information, but provided key 
meteorological data on conditions in the Arctic regions.  This data provided glimpses of 
processes occurring in the northern parts of the world, a key factor in the weather of the 
Atlantic and Pacific regions.cxxi 
In 1956, the Navy’s main weather office (Fleet Weather Central) and the National 
Weather Bureau shared Federal Building #4 in Suitland, MD.  This led to close 
cooperation between these agencies to avoid duplication and share resources.  This 
spirit of cooperation created the Joint Ice Center, which became the National/Naval Ice 
Center in 1995.  Today, this organization provides data and Arctic forecasts to all 
government and civilian authorities in the United States and Canada.cxxii 
After the advent of NWP, the Navy increased the amount of data coming to its 
weather central locations for inclusion into the forecast models.  These efforts continue 
to the present day.  One of the most recent data gathering efforts utilizes Autonomous 
Underwater Vehicles (AUV) deployed in critical locations.  These vehicles rely on their 
internal programming to conduct surveys of ocean environments without being 
tethered or otherwise controlled.  They operate using preprogrammed instructions, and 
artificial intelligence software located in onboard computers.  Tests at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, have involved AUV’s uploading information 
directly to Mine Warfare Decision Aids models, giving commanders real-time data in 
deciding how to neutralize the threat of mines.cxxiii  In addition to mine warfare 
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operations, these vehicles collect environmental data in areas otherwise unavailable to 
weather personnel.  Examples include gathering environmental data in advance of a 
SEAL team landing in a hostile littoral environment, or assessing conditions in an 
enemy’s harbor.   AUV’s have a variety of sensor platforms aboard, including advanced 
side scan and acoustic lens sonars.  In 2001, the Navy purchased fourteen AUV’s, and 
deployed them in Fleet Battle Exercises, assessing their operational capabilities. cxxiv 
Another recent advance in data collection involves remote buoys deployed by 
navy ships, aircraft and submarines.  Weather collection buoys have been deployed by 
the Navy since 1955.  On 11 October 1955, the first in a series of weather observation 
platforms were set adrift in the hurricane lanes north of Puerto Rico.  These buoys 
provided continuous information on tropical storm and hurricane development.cxxv  
The buoys employed today collect data in the littoral zone, in areas where amphibious 
troops may land.  In fleet exercises, US Navy Beachmasters deployed these littoral 
warfare buoys to determine oceanographic and meteorological conditions critical to the 
amphibious operations.  These small buoys (eighteen inches diameter and sixty-three 
pounds) were anchored in surf zones approaching beachheads.  The buoys transmitted 
data via ultrahigh radio frequency to a command station comprised of a laptop with a 
receiving antenna and a modem.  The data received was automatically plugged into 
atmospheric and oceanographic models.cxxvi 
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These buoys logged pitch, roll, and yaw, and also had accelerometers and 
magnetometers measuring wave characteristics.  Other information such as water 
depth, tides, currents, wind, and sea temperatures were also gathered.  This information 
gathering significantly reduced the time spent by the beachmaster in gathering 
oceanographic and meteorological information, and provided a more accurate picture 
of actual beach conditions.cxxvii 
Another important avenue of data collection has been via space-based platforms.  
The first pictures of the earth were taken in 1947 from a captured German V-2 rocket 
launched in New Mexico, and demonstrated the feasibility of weather observations 
from space.cxxviii  Several confidential studies were undertaken to assess the practicality 
of using an earth orbiting satellite, and its contribution to meteorological analyses.cxxix  
During the mid 1950’s, the Navy developed a launch vehicle known as the Vanguard, 
which proved very unreliable, exploding many times during its deployment.  During 
April 1958, the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) was formed to begin work 
on a satellite developed specifically for meteorology, TIROS I. TIROS I eventually made 
it into orbit under the aegis of NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration), 
and using a more reliable Army rocket. cxxx 
TIROS (Television and Infrared Observation Satellite) demonstrated the 
usefulness of observing the earth from space.  Cloud cover information provided by 
TIROS helped to locate weather systems and determined a multitude of atmospheric 
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motions.cxxxi  The successful launch of TIROS I on April 1, 1960, was followed by a flood 
of US and USSR meteorological satellites.   Between 1960 and 1970, thirty-three 
meteorological satellites were launched into space, and the age of satellite 
reconnaissance was born.cxxxii 
The momentum gained in the 1960’s carried over into the 1970’s and early 1980’s.  
Meteorological satellite programs flourished in an effective partnership between NASA 
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).  The development 
of geo-synchronous satellites, the Nimbus program, the Global Weather Experiment 
and the Earth Radiation Budget Experiment are just a few examples of the size and 
scope of cooperation between NASA and NOAA.cxxxiii 
During the 1980’s NASA abruptly decided not to fund the development and 
launching of meteorological satellites.  This was largely due to the high cost of 
developing these programs, and the rapid growth of federal decision-making and 
oversight. NOAA took over responsibility for the development of new weather 
satellites, and GEOS-8 was the first launched under the new leadership.cxxxiv   
Using space-based platforms, meteorologists can detect a broad range of energy 
from low to high extremes of the electromagnetic spectrum, and a host of other 
important variables such as:  sea temperature, ocean currents, surface winds, wave 
heights and distribution, surface topography, ocean color, sea levels, and ice 
accumulation.cxxxv  Satellite platforms measuring this phenomenon can be divided into 
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two separate categories.  First, geostationary vehicles orbit the equator at the same rate 
as the spin of the earth, and therefore stay over one geographical spot.  The second type 
are satellites that follow the lines of longitude from pole to pole, and are termed polar-
orbiting satellites.  These platforms have a variety of sensors tracking both visible and 
invisible portions of the radiation spectrum. 
  The data from these orbiting platforms is utilized by Navy METOC staff in 
computing their models.  One of the most important factors for METOC staff have been 
wind speeds and directions on the open ocean.  Although ship-based and buoy 
observations provide some data, METOC lacked sufficient coverage to provide a global 
wind map.  To construct global ocean wind conditions, METOC staff has turned to 
remote sensing of ocean wind patterns via space based platforms.cxxxvi  
The satellite platforms providing this detail use a specialized radar known as 
SeaWinds.  This type of sensor, also deployed in 1996 and 1998, uses a dish antenna 
with two beams which measures surface wind velocity, both speed and direction.   In 
addition to active sensing (radar), passive sensing (radiometers) also provides another 
way to measure wind speeds. Using polarimetric and multi-look observations, 
algorithms have been derived that allow an accurate depiction of wind.  The utilization 
of radiometers have been shown capable of determining ocean surface wind speed. The 
next scheduled launch of this instrument is aboard ADEOS-II, a satellite package to be 
launched by the Japanese Space Activities Commission.  The launch is scheduled for 
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November 2002.cxxxvii  The data taken from both active and passive instruments is 
processed by the Navy’s Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center using 
the algorithm developed by Goodberlet et al.cxxxviii 
In addition to the sources of data mentioned above, the Navy derives data from 
ships at sea, eight Navy military survey vessels, aircraft en route, mobile survey teams, 
unmanned aerial vehicles and other naval personnel stationed throughout the world.  
Also, several cooperative agreements with foreign nations allow the Navy access to 
more oceanographic and meteorological information.cxxxix 
The availability of more data has made the products generated by METOC staff 
more robust and accurate. As shown, naval forces have been adept at incorporating 
new technologies into their areas of specialty.  However, the availability of this 
information to on-scene commanders has been a concern. How does one get 
information to the right person at the right time?  This concern has been a long-standing 
one at the Navy.  As METOC produced products vital to the conduct of naval 
operations, the Navy sought ways to distribute information quickly to those that 
needed it. In 1963, the Naval Environmental Data Network (NEDN) was established 
allowing dissemination of weather products to naval personnel throughout the world.  
Upgrades to this network have allowed ever increasing volumes of information to be 
transmitted securely to locations worldwide. 
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Although the Navy has pioneered many different ways to gather data, 
contributions from the civilian sector have also added, or will be adding soon, to the 
growing sea of information.  For example, in 1998, NOAA issued a report asserting that 
wind velocities in the lower atmosphere represent the biggest hole in observational data 
to make short term forecasts.  Scientists based at the University of New Hampshire have 
devised a system employing Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) to measure the 
vertical stratification of winds in the lower atmosphere.  By using a laser and measuring 
the scattering of the beam, wind velocities lower than one meter per second can be 
measured. The experiments conducted at the Bartlett, sponsored by government 
organizations with direct ties to the Navy including National Environmental Satellite 
Data and Information Service (NESDIS), will validate the feasibility of this technique to 
measure winds. cxl 
SuomiNet, another project with close financial ties to the naval METOC 
community, utilizes the existing GPS navigational satellites to measure water vapor in 
the atmosphere.  Researchers have already demonstrated the feasibility of measuring 
water vapor, and current work attempts to utilize the data in short term forecasting 
techniques.cxli 
Water vapor, especially precipitable water vapor (PWV) plays a significant role 
in the formation and propagation of weather.  However, water vapor remains one of the 
most poorly measured meteorological characteristics.cxlii  A network of observing 
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stations, SuomiNet, provides data from stations in the United States and abroad.  
Plymouth State College, in Plymouth, NH, currently participates in SuomiNet guided 
by Professor Joseph Zabranksy and students Derek Brown and Sean Clarke.  PSC is the 
first SuomiNet member to utilize its own data in the construction of forecasts.cxliii  By 
using PWV data from SuomiNet, forecasters have positively impacted the short-range 
rainfall prediction and the moisture structure recovery.cxliv 
The development of weather sensing and forecasting technologies is a 
partnership between government and civilian organizations.  The Navy will reap the 
benefits of civilian research.  However, civilians also benefit from the military 
organizations.  Recently, the US Navy and The Weather Channel announced a 
partnership to improve the forecasting available to the public.  On April 13, 2001, 
RADM Richard West signed a memorandum of Understanding with Vice President Ray 
Ban of the Weather Channel.  The agreement allows The Weather Channel to access 
previously unavailable data to help construct more accurate forecasts.  Specifically, the 
Navy will allow The Weather Channel to access COAMPS to help predict the weather 
in the littoral areas of the world.  “Such collaborations will ultimately benefit the 
advancement of the science of weather prediction, ensuring the nation gets the greatest 
possible benefit from their investment in weather and oceanography.”cxlv 
Advancements in technology have dramatically improved the quality of 
forecasting provided by METOC staff to Navy decision makers and other Department 
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of Defense personnel.  These improvements have included not only innovations and 
improvements on the part of the Navy, but contributions from the civilian sector as 
well.  With the combined efforts of government and civilian organization, weather 
forecasting for everybody has been becoming more accurate. 
The accuracy of these forecasts and the direction of technology poses several 
interesting questions for the future of METOC operations and staff.  What will the 
impact of technology be on staffing?  What are the current trends in technology and will 
computers replace human forecasters? 
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Chapter Four:  The Present and Future of METOC 
METOC staff has played a critical role in recent deployments of US forces.  
Operations in the Adriatic Sea during the Kosovo Crisis of 1998 (Operation Noble 
Anvil) relied heavily on the data gathered by US Navy personnel both prior and during 
the conflict.  METOC also provided critical forecasting for cases especially dependent 
on weather conditions.  These examples underscore the important role of METOC in the 
Navy.  However, trends in how the Navy deploys and conducts warfighting could 
potentially change how METOC executes its task.  The proliferation of network centric 
warfare may impact the distribution of human assets within the METOC community. 
In the last decade, METOC staff has provided critical data as quickly as possible 
to the forces that rely upon it for vital information.    Several proposals in the last 
decade have suggested improving the pace of information distribution to field units.  In 
1995, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) advanced a new 
approach to METOC functions.  Rapid Environmental Assessment (REA) is a process 
that fulfills the requirement to determine accurately key environmental features of the 
maritime littoral environment.cxlvi  Although SACLANT is a NATO position, a large 
part of NATO’s maritime force disposition is composed of U.S. Naval units.  
Consequently, this approach to METOC functions has started to permeate U.S. naval 
operations.  At a conference in 1997, Edward Whitman presented a paper that detailed 
the evolving requirements for the U.S. Navy to shift to REA.  According to Whitman, 
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the REA requires “a shift in emphasis from large scale, predictive, numerical models to 
‘nowcasting’, quick reaction surveys….innovative processing techniques and through-
the-sensor environmental measurements.”cxlvii  In order to make the shift, Whitman 
argues that there needs to be a fundamental change in the operational structure.  “More 
powerful METOC fusion capabilities [need to be] deployed aboard ships and forward 
command facilities.”  In addition to greater sensor capabilities and more timely 
presentation of data, this includes the deployment of METOC personnel in forward 
areas to provide support to the decision maker. cxlviii 
This deployment of personnel allows METOC staff to support naval operations 
in the complex littoral environment.  This support includes oceanographic and 
meteorological information that enables commanders to make decisions affecting the 
conduct of battles.  Some of these decisions include schedules, equipment deployment, 
and weapons selection.  These decisions in regard to the “battlespace” would be nearly 
impossible without the support of METOC staff.  This is especially true in littoral areas. 
On-scene in the battle environment, METOC provides essential information in 
support of operations.  The METOC forecaster has many different products from which 
to brief an on-scene commander.  Synoptic forecasts and conditions ensure the safe 
passage of naval vessels while local and mesoscale forecasts and conditions provide key 
data when deploying certain weapon and sensor systems.  In most cases, the naval 
weather forecaster is not the key decision maker for naval operations.  Their job is to 
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translate the meteorological data into information that the on-scene commander can use 
to make choices.cxlix 
When translating environmental data, METOC staff construct decision aids by 
repackaging forecast information into a simple form so that a decision maker can assess 
the threat to their forces and/or systems.  In order to repackage the data, the forecaster 
needs to know not only the weather, but the type of weapon system, threat, or sensor-
array that the decision maker has at their disposal.  For example, if the directional radar 
on a guided missile loses effectiveness in rainy conditions, the forecaster would need to 
know the exact limitations of the radar and the weather conditions in the intended path 
of the missile.cl  
In addition to knowing the weather and weapons systems, METOC staff provide 
tools that can provide alternate forms of support.  The on-board Tactical Environmental 
Support System (TESS) can produce reports that summarize the current visibility of 
fleet operations to enemy radar, chaff dispersal prediction when attacked by enemy 
missiles and planes, radiological fallout patterns, and ballistic wind reports for naval 
gunfire.cli  The REACT (Rapid Environmental Assessment Chart-Tactical) and STOIC 
(Special Topographic Oceanographic Intelligence Chart) are two examples of 
specialized METOC products used in military decision making.  These products 
combine beach survey information, water column information, tides, wave action, and 
many other weather conditions essential to the safe conduct of operations.clii   
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Additionally, prediction models such as COAMPS can be run on a local computer to 
provide discrete weather modeling information. 
To support REA, the Navy has made several recent changes in its deployment of 
METOC staff.   Mobile Environmental Teams accompany special operations forces, 
including SEAL detachments, and provide local observation and product support via 
SIPRNET (a secure satellite based information network).  For larger operations, Fleet 
Survey Teams deploy and provide hydrographic surveys of tactically important regions 
to US Navy and other Department of Defense customers.cliii 
Some of these policies provided enormous rewards.  In 1994, the survey ship 
USNS Littlehales conducted survey operations off the coastline of Albania.  Although 
the survey covered a coastline of only 360 kilometers, the information gathered on tides, 
currents, and bottom topography proved important to the Albanian economy.  All the 
data gathered was made available to the Albanian government, who welcomed the 
survey ship to their territorial waters.cliv 
Although the Albanians received important data, the military value of the survey 
operation emerged in 1999.  The US Navy utilized this data during Operation Noble 
Anvil when dealing with the crisis in former Yugoslavia.  From this data, large full-scale 
color charts supplied to surface ship and submarine commanders allowed safe planning 
of routes in the Adriatic.  “Without accurate information of the Albanian coastline, ships 
could have run around, even sunk.”clv 
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In addition to providing survey data, Mobile Environmental Teams (MET) also 
deployed aboard ships sortied to the Adriatic.  These METOC personnel, from Rota, 
Spain and Norfolk, VA, specialized in the changeable weather of the Adriatic.  Their 
contributions permeated every area of Navy operations.  METOC personnel provided 
full-spectrum weather services, including twice daily weather briefings to ship 
commanders, Tactical Oceanographic Summary (TOS), Tactical Atmospheric Summary 
(TAS), and bathythermograph observations.clvi 
These services proved crucial to operations.  The winter season in the Adriatic 
provided a difficult forecasting environment with the presence of localized wind 
phenomena such as the Bora and the Sirocco.  These winds often limited operations of 
the NATO fleet, and accurate forecasting played a critical role.  Navy operations 
changed three times because of the forecasted winds and their impact on navigation.  
Besides navigation, the winds had other consequences due to their intensity.  In one 
instance, pilots lost contact with their home ship located only two miles away.clvii 
Forecasters also provided support for air operations against Serb targets, 
sometimes more than 600 miles distant.  Low visibility and ceiling over the target areas 
limited the effectiveness of air strikes, and weather windows had to be identified in 
order to deliver PGM’s to their targets.  Slow-moving frontal systems moved through 
the target region every three or four days, producing heavy cloud cover as well as 
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precipitation and fog.  This made mission planning very difficult, and very dependent 
on METOC staff.clviii 
In addition to providing information to assist offensive operations, METOC staff 
provided defensive support as well.  The biggest threat to naval assets in the Adriatic 
were shore-based SSN-2 and SSN-3 Styx missile sites.  Since the position of the coastal 
acquisition radar units were known, METOC staff generated coverage diagrams 
showing the effective range of these targeting systems.  By taking into consideration the 
weather, ocean conditions, and geography, coverage diagrams provided an extra 
measure of security and were used by the ship commanders to plan their routes.clix 
Another threat to ships involved the Sava-class attack submarine used by the 
Serbian Navy.  When the conflict commenced, METOC had no data about the 
operational characteristics of the Serbian vessel.  By teaming up with the Office of Naval 
Intelligence, METOC staff sourced information useful in the detection of the submarine.  
These parameters enabled METOC to fine-tune sonar equipment, and to produce 
acoustic detection ranges.  This information allowed ship commanders to manage the 
submarine threat of the Serbian Navy.clx 
In addition to military operations involving adversaries, METOC staff play an 
important role in peacetime.  When the USS Cole was attacked on October 12, 2000, 
seventeen sailors died and the ship suffered extraordinary damage.  The damage to the 
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ship required transportation for the Cole to the Litton Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, 
MS. 
The Norwegian ship M/V Blue Marlin brought the Cole to Mississippi, and safely 
arrived on December 13th, 2000.    From evidence in the photograph below, wind 
information was very crucial during the ship’s journey from Yemen to the United 
States.  METOC staff provided support for this transit, including a major first in 
forecasting. 
Figure 3: M/V Blue Marlin carrying USS Coleclxi 
 
The first in forecasting feat accomplished by the Navy involved predicting the 
winds and wave heights along the route of the Blue Marlin.  Although METOC 
routinely uses a wave action model (WAM) to predict sea heights, the Marlin/Cole 
transit marked the first time METOC used a high-resolution domain from the start to 
finish of the route.  And, it also marked the first time that data from NOGAPS and 
COAMPS provided the essential inputs to WAM.  METOC staff created domains 
    74 
approximately two days sailing time, which meant that every other day required a new 
forecast area.clxii 
The winds from these forecasts were linked to WAM, which calculates wave 
height by taking wind speed and determining how much wave energy will change as a 
result of the winds.  NOGAPS data filled the wind inputs in the sparse data areas 
(South Atlantic) and COAMPS provided data upon reaching the Caribbean Sea.clxiii 
Accompanying the Blue Marlin/Cole transit, a METOC team deployed a localized 
model to provide additional input.  DAMPS (Distributed Atmospheric Mesoscale 
Prediction System) is an automated, forward-deployed nowcast/forecast system which 
is run on UNIX workstations in the field.  It provides on-demand tactical forecasts with 
resolutions from 108 km to three km.  Although DAMPS had been previously utilized 
by the Navy, it had never been deployed on-board a moving ship.  METOC provided a 
numerical weather prediction model for a mobile customer.clxiv 
The employment of a moving numerical weather model represents a step in the 
direction of  NOWCAST.  NOWCAST represents the future of the Navy’s METOC 
services.  NOWCAST is a system composed of several components, including high-
speed data interchange and artificial intelligence algorithms.  The Office of Naval 
Research, the National Center for Atmospheric Research and the Lincoln Laboratory at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology are developing this system.  Some basic 
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components of NOWCAST have been proven to function in current naval operations, 
and the system holds significant promise for the future. 
NOWCAST was conceived due to a major deficiency in weather forecasting and 
observations supporting naval operations.  This deficiency is not a lack of METOC 
forecasting proficiency, but a time delay in the collection, assimilation of data, and the 
production of materials used by operational commanders.  It is impossible under the 
current system to get short term forecasts (1-4 hours in the future.)  Additionally, naval 
operations do not have the capability to share a common consistent depiction of the 
battlespace environment.clxv 
A common, current, depiction of the battlespace environment is essential in the 
conduct of operations.  By providing the same depiction to all personnel involved in the 
operations, more consistent decisions and situational awareness can be achieved.  
Currently, a wide variety of depictions provide information, depending on the 
geographical location of units participating in the operation, the deployment of METOC 
personnel and resources, and access to high-speed data links.  To solve this problem of 
consistent timely depiction, a variety of new technologies are being exploited.  These 
include forward deployed sensing systems, advances in data fusion technology, and the 
ubiquity of the internet. 
By utilizing the internet as the medium of information exchange, NOWCAST 
systems will be able to provide near-term forecasts (1-2 hour) to military operations.  
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The system employs a database of environmental conditions that receives updates 
every five to fifteen minutes.  Using COAMPS as a base line, the NOWCAST polls 
environmental conditions, checks for latest satellite and radar data, then publishes data 
via SIPRNET.  Authenticated users have access to accurate forecasts for important 
phenomena such as microbursts and wind shear conditions.clxvi  These authenticated 
users include every unit involved in an operation, providing a common view of the 
battlespace. 
NOWCAST leverages some of the investment the US Navy has made in 
information technology.  Other uses of this same information technology have been 
proposed by the educational leaders of the Navy.  In the past ten years, the Navy has 
recognized that its adversary has changed.  The Soviet Union has dissolved, and new 
challenges in the form of regional conflicts in littoral spaces are emerging.  The enemies 
we face today have access to weapons of mass destruction, and some of the 
technologies that we utilize in our armed forces.  Although we are clearly the dominant 
military and economic power in the world today, the Navy has chosen not to rest on its 
Cold War laurels.  In order to counter the emerging threats, the Navy is transitioning to 
a new method of fighting battles, a method that first originated in the civilian sector:  
the networking of distributed resources.  The Navy calls this approach Network Centric 
Warfare. 
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This need to disseminate information quickly has been a cornerstone in the 
information revolution in the civilian sector.  Initially, business utilized large 
centralized mainframe computers dedicated to business critical tasks.  The Navy 
followed this model in the construction of centralized data processing centers equipped 
with the most powerful computers available.  However, starting in the 1980’s business 
began to exploit the power found in personal computers by creating networks.  These 
networks distributed computing power and data throughout the business.  Today, 
handheld Personal Digital Assistants access cellular telephone networks, e-mail 
programs and the Internet all from a small handheld unit. 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) leverages the advances made in information 
technology.  In many ways, NCW is a response not only to a new host of adversaries, 
but to the information age of the late 20th and early 21st centuries.clxvii  Like the 
businesses of the 1980’s, the Navy and other armed forces have centers of information 
that would benefit personnel if they were easily distributed and shared.  NCW is an 
information superiority that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, 
decision makers and shooters to achieve a shared awareness of the battlespace.  This 
increases the speed of command, the tempo of operations, the survivability of forces 
and a higher degree of synchronization.clxviii 
Military operations have reached a point where expenditures for a weapons 
platform become meaningless unless the command and control processes that fire a 
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weapon are quick enough to react.  VADM Arthur Cebrowski advanced the idea of 
NCW during his tenure as President of the Naval War College in Newport, RI.  In an 
article appearing in the October 2000 Royal United Services Journal, Cebrowski notes: 
But the fact of the matter is that unless you are prepared to fix the command and 
control delay time issue, you are wasting your money to buy this [expensive] 
system.  This is also an element of information superiority and should be viewed 
as such. Shooting is really dominated by command and control delay time.  You 
can spend a lot of money on hypersonic weapons, and it doesn’t make any 
difference.clxix 
Massive amounts of money spent on weapons can be wasted if the proper 
information is not delivered in a timely fashion. 
Network Centric Warfare directly applies to METOC because the information 
provided by its staff directly impacts the decisions of the battlefield commander.  When 
trying to attain situational awareness, a decision maker must know not only locations 
and strengths of friendly and enemy units, but the options available for offensive or 
defensive responses.  Any sort of decision requires complete knowledge of the 
meteorological and oceanographic conditions. 
NCW is currently a proposal within the Naval Sea Systems Command.  As a 
concept, it is being studied at the Naval War College, and evaluated using a simulated 
environment.  Several war game scenarios have been executed, and the benefits of 
NCW are apparent.   
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With advances in numerical weather prediction, computer processing power, 
and data gathering, the future role of human METOC staff comes into question.  With 
the rollout of NCW, information will be processed faster and more accurately than 
before.  With more data being fed into more accurate computer models, the accuracy of 
predictions will increase.  For example, NOGAPS accuracy has improved tremendously 
since 1987, a twenty percent increase in the ninety six hour forecast.clxx   Is there a point 
when human interaction with weather forecasting will cease to exist? 
Computers and the machines driven by them (robots) have replaced human 
workers in several sectors of the economy.  Bank tellers and automobile assembly 
workers are only two of a myriad of examples.   Unlike some sectors of the civilian 
economy, it is unlikely that METOC staff will find themselves replaced by the 
burgeoning technologies that improve forecasts. 
One piece of evidence that supports this is the sheer number of numerical 
weather prediction models that are utilized by forecasters.  These constructs are just 
models of what might happen.  A model by definition does not incorporate every 
variable that is in the actual atmosphere.  In order to simplify the calculation process, 
certain assumptions about the atmosphere are made, and these assumptions are not 
always indicative of reality.  In any weather forecasting, there is an interpretation of the 
models, and a certain amount of human guessing to fill in the gaps left by the 
models.clxxi   
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METOC staff can look at the NOGAPS and COAMPS models and get an idea of 
what might happen down the road.  The development of high and low pressure 
systems, and of precipitation centers may or may not occur according to factors beyond 
the scope of the weather models.  Some of these factors include terrain data, and real 
time sea temperature data.  Human forecasters routinely look at these outputs, then 
adjust them based on their experience with past forecasting. 
One factor which is limiting the accuracy of models like NOGAPS and COAMPS 
is the nature of the atmosphere itself. The atmosphere exhibits fluid behavior, which is 
innately chaotic. clxxii   E. N. Lorenz, a meteorologist at Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology ran a particular numerical model with almost precisely the same data 
inputs and received vastly different results.clxxiii  This would suggest that no matter how 
many points in space are covered by instruments and no matter how much data is put 
into the model, the chaos theory suggests movement which is not predictable.clxxiv 
METOC staff remain safe from replacement because of the nature of the models, 
and the inherent characteristics of the atmosphere. Their ability to provide more 
accurate forecasts to naval operations is enhanced by the use of technology.  However, 
the elimination of human interpretation and guessing from the weather prediction 
process is not likely to happen. 
Today’s METOC staff provide increasingly accurate products via techniques 
under the Rapid Environmental Assessment protocol, and continue to leverage 
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advances in computer technology.  As demonstrated in Operation Noble Anvil, 
METOC staff and their decision aids provided mission-critical information to the US 
Navy and other armed forces.  In the quest for constant improvement, plans for systems 
such as NOWCAST will only improve the services provided by the highly trained 
meteorologists and oceanographers. Although technology has replaced humans in 
several sectors of civilian life, it is unlikely that computer technology will replace the 
human forecaster due to the chaotic nature of the atmosphere.   
The Navy must use vigilance in deploying solutions and enhancements to the 
business of warfighting.  By relying on innovations such as NOWCAST technologies, 
precision guided munitions, and computer intensive weather modeling, new and very 
real vulnerabilities emerge.  If an adversary launches a successful attack on the Navy’s 
information system and disrupts the flow of data, units would be without vital support.  
An entity launching an attack on a data distribution system does not require substantial 
financial resources, only knowledge of information technology.  Examples of 
information sabotage or inadvertent network disruption permeate our society.  Solar 
flares disrupt satellite communications, disable personal pagers, and render ATM’s 
useless.  Users routinely point out deficiencies in information systems by making 
unauthorized logins to the Federal Reserve or the Pentagon computer system.  These 
events and others like them reveal the paradox of technology. 
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As we use more technology, we become dependent and addicted to the services 
they provide.  Similar to the relationship between the Romans and the Germanic tribes 
in the first four centuries of the first millennium A.D., our society has become addicted 
to technology.  While technological innovations make our everyday lives easier, they 
also create vulnerability.   
The US Navy has reigned supreme on the world’s oceans for approximately sixty 
years.  Part of the Navy’s success has been its ability to adapt and exploit new 
technologies.  As METOC moves forward in providing the best possible forecasting to 
the Navy and other DoD customers, steps should be taken to minimize vulnerabilities 
inherent with the deployment of information technology and Network Centric Warfare. 
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Conclusion 
Historically, weather has played a key role in the outcome of military operations.  
Although is it rarely the single greatest determiner, its part in the conduct of military 
operations is clear.  At sea, because of the nature of the environment, forecasting plays 
an especially critical role.  The US Navy and its METOC staff provide the best 
forecasting possible in the most difficult environments, including the complex littoral 
areas.  By leveraging investments in information technology, working together with 
civilian partners, and providing continuous training, METOC has risen to the 
challenges at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries.  These 
advancements have helped navy personnel provide increasingly accurate models of the 
environmental conditions that impact the systems and people waging war.  And, 
although the advancements have provided exceptional tools, they do not preclude the 
continuing significance of the human assets in weather forecasting. 
Clearly, knowledge of the weather is important.  For many years, humans have 
tried to control nature.  By simply understanding it, and learning to work within the 
guidelines it provides, military operations gain significant tactical advantages.  In the 
20th century, weather has made a transition from being a great equalizer to becoming a 
force multiplier.  Intimate knowledge of environmental conditions and accurate 
predictions of their future evolution significantly enhance the fighting capability of 
armed forces.  Prior to the massive technological changes in the 1950’s and 1960’s, 
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adversaries dealt with the same conditions, and the same abilities to forecast the 
weather.  Any weather advantage, or “weather gauge”, relied upon the unpredictable 
and mysterious movements of weather systems.  Ghengis Khan’s invasion of Japan was 
thwarted by a typhoon that could not be predicted by his weather diviners.  However, 
the changes in ability to forecast, the increased weather-sensitivity of weapons systems, 
and the new operating environment of the littoral regions has drastically altered the 
importance of METOC forecasts.   
In the 21st century, the Navy can use knowledge of the environmental conditions 
to its advantage in the selection of weapons systems, and the deployment of forces.  By 
knowing, for example, the environmental limitations of laser-guided munitions, or the 
acquisition characteristics of enemy search RADARS (as in Operation Noble Anvil) 
significant advantages for US Navy forces are created.  In these cases, weather becomes 
a force multiplier to the side with the most comprehensive understanding of the 
environment. 
The superiority of US forces in weather characterization and forecasting has 
created a “weather gap” in relation to America’s potential adversaries.  The ability for 
Navy METOC staff to predict the weather is without peer.  This weather gap is a 
significant advantage, especially in today’s world where other gaps are closing.  For 
example, advanced weapons are now available to anybody with the money or political 
capital to source them.  Examples of this proliferation range from weapons of mass 
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destruction to shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles.  Given the closing gaps in other 
areas, US forces need to find new edges in combat, and the weather is one of those 
advantages. 
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